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\begin{center}{\huge Logic and Decision Making}\end{center}
\begin{center}{\large David Over}\end{center}
\begin{center}{\large University of Sunderland}\end{center}
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There are different and largely separate psychological literatures on logical 
reasoning and on decision making. This division has limited psychological 
theories in both areas, and particularly held up the study of ordinary 
reasoning. People do not ordinarily reason from a restricted set of arbitrary 
assumptions taken, in effect, to be certainly true. Much more often they try 
to perform inferences from all their relevant beliefs, holding few of these 
with absolute confidence. They also often perform inferences from statements 
made to them, as in two-person arguments, but treat few of these statements 
as absolutely reliable. Probability judgements are central to both of these 
ordinary cases, as these clearly affect confidence and perceived relevance. 
Utility judgements, about both epistemic and non-epistemic benefits and 
costs, are another major factor affecting relevance. To balance probability 
and utility in performing an action, including an inference, is to make a 
decision, if only implicitly. Moreover, to find out how much confidence one 
should have in a premise one must make decisions, balancing probability and 
utility, in the search for data or evidence. All these points can be 
illustrated in experimental work on uncertainty in the premises of a 
deduction, on so-called belief bias about its conclusion, and on how people 
investigate conditionals. Suggestions will be made about how psychological 
theories of deduction can be extended to cover these facts. However, in 
relating ordinary reasoning and decision making to each other, normative 
questions arise that are more a matter for logicians and philosophers than 
for psychologists.

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